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Intro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- List of Boxes, Diagrams, Figures and Tables -- List of Cases -- 1. Accountability Matters -- I. A Definition, Puzzle and Issue -- II. Accounting for Structure -- PART I: FRAMING -- 2. Questions of Perspective - Accountability as a Behavioural Proposition -- I. Two Accountability Approaches -- II. Blending and Binding: The 'Cool' End of Accountability Behaviours -- III. Blending and Binding: The 'Noisy' End of Accountability Behaviours -- 3. Questions of Measurement: Striking an Accountability Balance -- I. Quantifying Accountability -- II. An Accountability Ideal -- III. Proportionality, Tensions and Balance -- 4. Loss of Balance? Exploring the 'Dark Side' of Accountability -- I. Why might Accountability be 'Bad' for Democracy? -- II. How was the 'Dark Side' Thesis Initially Received? -- III. What Do We Know about the Pathologies of Accountability Ten Years On? -- 5. Fuzzy Law, Executive Powers and the Problem of Accountability -- I. Enter 'Fuzzy Law' -- II. Constitution-Generated Fuzziness -- III. Legislative-Generated Fuzziness -- IV. Executive-Generated Fuzziness -- V. Accountability and Fuzziness: What Can be Done? -- 6. Collaborative Constitutional Accountability -- I. Political or Legal Constitutionalism -- II. Collaborative Constitutionalism -- III. Collaborative Constitutionalism in Practice -- IV. Conclusion -- PART II: THEMES -- 7. Questions of Control: Accountability in the Shadow of Prorogation -- I. Constitutional Flux and Constitutional Truths -- II. Judicial Power -- III. Doing Things Differently -- 8. Questions of Counsel: Accountability and Policy Advice -- I. Distance, Divides and Disconnects -- Ii. Wiring It Up -- III. Speaking Truth to Power -- 9. Enforcing the Conventions of Constitutional Monarchy -- I. Case Study 1: The Duty to Summon Parliaments.

'War and Press Freedom: The Problem of Prerogative Power' by Jeffrey A. Smith is reviewed.

Sammelrezension von Veröffentlichungen zum Regierungsstil von US-Präsident Ronald Reagan unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Iran-Contra-Affäre

The Supreme Court in Miller upheld the Divisional Court, and decided that the government could not trigger Article 50 TEU to begin withdrawing from the EU without statutory authorization from Parliament. The result was widely predicted, with the media estimating that the Supreme Court would divide 7-4 in favour of the claimant. This was pretty accurate, given that the ruling turned out to be 8-3. The Miller decision has already achieved its place in the history books, being the most blogged about case in the UK. It is a record that will not easily be broken. The spectre of justice being conducted in media real time becomes the new reality, bearing affinity to the way in which we conduct other areas of life ranging from politics to war. The ratings for the Supreme Court televised hearings may not yet have usurped more traditional TV classics, but reality TV producers will assuredly see the potential of such hearings, although they may struggle to render arguments concerning fallacious constitutional syllogisms appealing to the wider public. There is much that could be said about the case from a broader political perspective. This article will, however, focus on the issues of UK constitutional law raised by the decision. The case concerned structural constitutional review, in which the Supreme Court demarcated the ambit of legislative and executive power. It is axiomatic, as all students learn in first year constitutional law, that there are limits on prerogative power. Professors regularly intone those limits in lectures, and text writers duly repeat them in their books. A case is of enduring constitutional importance when it forces us to recognize the ambiguities inherent in such oft-repeated axioms. Miller is a hallmark decision as judged by this criterion. I believe that the majority was correct in its interpretation of these constraints, but the result was not simple or self-evident. There was a powerful dissent, most especially from Lord Reed, which has been supported by some weighty academic argument. These ...